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Abstract
Τhe paper analyses the new right of human intervention in use of information
technology, automatization processes and advanced algorithms in individual decisionmaking activities. Art. 22 of the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
provides that the data subject has the right not to be subject to a fully automated
decision on matters of legal importance to her interests, hence the data subject has a
right to human intervention in this kind of decisions
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1. Introduction
The right to human intervention is a renewed right under Art. 22 of the General Data
Protection Regulation,. The purpose of this right is to address the fear of the
'instrumentalization' of the person, when important decisions affecting the person are
taken solely by automatic decision making. Such important decisions that can be taken
by automatic decision making include, for example, hiring personnel, the granting of a
loan by a bank or entering into a health insurance contract. Citizens have been
generally supported as benefiting from automatic decision making, as this method has
been shown to constitute an efficient way of cost containment, as well as being possibly
fairer than the taking of exclusively human decisions. The present analysis deals with
the right to human intervention from a legal, ethical/philosophical and technological
point of view. Law and ethics will be examined in connection to the technological
neutrality of algorithms as a way to ascertain the lack of discrimination and bias and the
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protection of the human rights of citizens. The paper will deal with: (a) the true and
correct interpretation of the existing law on the right to human intervention; (b) new
protective provisions, both for citizens affected by automatic decision making but also
with the provisions for organizations/other entities for whom the use of automatic
decision making is a crucial part of their operations; (c) an analysis of the
philosophical/ethical foundations of the above rights; (d) ethical rules on automated
decision making; and (e) the fundamental principles of the making of algorithms, which
will primarily serve the principles of justice, transparency, accountability and equality for
citizens.
Furthermore, the paper will analyze, along with the legal, ethical/philosophical
and technological implications of the right to human intervention, the technical way of
automated decision making towards serving the principles of justice, transparency,
accountability and equality.

2. State of the art
The international literature and press have presented us with innumerous cases and
stories, as well as research projects, which show algorithmic inequalities, discrimination
and bias. Search engines, internet applications of many kinds, such as e-dating, Airbnb,
Uber, etc., are being constantly accused of racism, misogyny and class discrimination.
The critics demand the purification of the algorithms and human intervention in decision
making, towards the total ascertainment of due process for consumers. An attempt to
provide a partial answer to these criticisms in Europe was made by virtue of Art. 22
GDPR
2.1. The Law
The right to human intervention, as enshrined in Art. 22 of the GDPR, is not exactly a
new right. It has evolved from the older, similar right under Art. 15 of the Data Protection
Directive 95/46/EC,. Art. 22 GDPR provides that the data subject shall have the right not
to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling,
which produces legal effects concerning the data subject or which affects the data
subject significantly, in a similar way. Crucially, profiling is explicitly included in the
provision and its meaning is defined as the automated personal data processing
towards the evaluation of certain traits on the person's performance in her work, the
financial situation of the person, her health, her personal preferences, interests,
reliability or behavior, as well as the position of movements of a person. Art. 22 is all the
more important due to the possibilities of the analysis of Big Data. As an exception, the
paper provides that the right shall not apply (a) where the decision is necessary for
entering into, or for the performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data
controller; (b) it is authorized by European Union or Member State law to which the
controller is subject and which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data
subject's rights, freedoms and legitimate interests; or (c) where the decision is based on
the data subject's explicit consent.
These provisions, as clear as they may appear, have already given rise to
serious doubts, internationally, as to their interpretation. It is supported that Art. 22

provides an absolute prohibition of automated decision making without human
intervention, unless an exception (Art. 22, par. 2 a, b or c) applies. Indeed, the Article 29
Data Protection Working Party issued guidelines on automated decision making and
profiling, supporting precisely this interpretation. It has also been argued, however, that
the right under Art. 22 provides only a sui generis right to object to automated decision
making, without, at the same time, granting a ‘pure’ right to human intervention. Yet
another interpretation suggests that it introduces a right to explanation regarding the
decision taken, with arguments based on Arts. 13, 14 and 15 of the GDPR and the
Recital 71. This construction has also been heavily criticized, stating that no such rights
has been instituted, but a much more limited right to information of the data subject. A
third view suggests that both previous constructions are mistaken and that we much
stick to what the Regulation really states, namely a right to meaningful information, for
the data subject, who can also ask for the logic of the automated decision making in
question. In some texts we see that the most trivial intervention by a natural person
means that the requirements of Art. 22 have been met, whereas other researchers
claim that this intervention must be substantial, and also, by a competent to decide
person. We are confronted, therefore, with a field of important disagreements, where,
however, it is crucial to arrive soon at a complete resolution of these questions.
The numerous official objections and comments filed on the draft guidelines of
the Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party which took a clear position for the absolute
prohibition of automated decision making under Art. 22 show us that this matter
presents us, already before the application of the Regulation, serious difficulties of
interpretation. They also show us that the issue affects a series of important sectors
such as banking, commerce, education, public security, the workplace, insurance and
many more.
2.2 Ethics
The right to human intervention gives rise to a series of philosophical/ethical questions.
The designer of an automated decision system, of the algorithms, bears an important
moral responsibility to avoid as much as possible any bias which may be inserted in the
system, a responsibility not fully explored in the literature. Another novel ethical
question relates to the autonomy of the ethical person and is twofold: it touches, on the
one hand, the controller and the manager of the algorithms, and on the other hand, the
data subject who is being affected by these algorithms. The autonomy of the former is
being limited, as there is no room for an evaluation under his own free will;
parameterization and the initial preparation of the algorithmic system conclude his
involvement and the next choices are made by the automated system itself. The
controller/manager, therefore is unable to exercise a main facet of his freedom as a
moral person, a freedom which would allow him to change his mind, in line with a
potential future change of circumstances. To cite Kant, this limitation of freedom of will
in relation to the initial stages of the construction of the system also limits his freedom
and his dignity. As regards the data subject being evaluated, he cannot project
elements of his personality, which are not capable of being evaluation under the system
used, as they are not able to be parameterized.
If we use as an example the case of the automatic hiring in the public or private
sector with an automated decision making system, this could lead is, initially, to state

that this way is the best answer to a series of 'pathological'; instances ; neither
favoritism nor nepotism can survive, in theory at least, this system. The role of human
judgment is minimized or even, extinguished and with it, also the risk of fallacies or
negligence for which human judgment is notorious. The application of algorithmic
standards and automated decision making has been already applied for many years in
sectors such as the economy and has been perfected by the use of hedge funds,
banking institutions and state organizations, promises equality before the law,
meritocracy, justice and equal opportunity to anyone enjoying the same qualifications to
gain a place in the public or private sector. However, as nothing is clear of all negative
or potentially harmful effects, the total ban of the human intervention due to automated
decision making is coupled with important ethical implications.
Will we really achieve our goals of meritocracy, justice, equality? Even if data
management takes place without human intervention, by algorithms, the choice of the
data sets and their parameters to be taken, or, more importantly, the choice of data that
is to be omitted from the calculation, remains a task for a human, who will always
parameterize the systems of algorithms. In other words, it seems that human
intervention does not exactly ‘vanish’ in reality, but rather that it is assigned at an earlier
stage to said automated decision-making system, before the process of selection. This,
however, negates, or at least severely weakens, the possible legal contest of the results
of a public sector competition by a particular person, since the results are not related to
a particular case, but to a whole class.
The third, and possibly more crucial ethical issue, deals exactly with the above
inability to parameterize particular traits of human personality, which are essential to our
humanness. One can never parameterize a character and a personality, therefore these
remain outwith the scope of perception of any automated decision-making system.
Nevertheless, this inability despises our most important personal and professional traits,
our morality and our virtues, precisely because morality and virtues cannot be
parameterized. Consequently, the choices made entirely by algorithms neglect the only
trait of our personality that, in reality, guarantees our normal inclusion and functionality
within the workplace and, in general, within any social environment.
2.3. Artificial Intelligence
As far as automated decisions that take place by artificial intelligence are concerned,
what we initially look for is technological neutrality, so as to prevent, as much as
possible, bias and discrimination from this very first initial stage of setting up the
systems. As it is people who make algorithms, they are also subject to the chance that
bias and discrimination are instituted within the system when it is being made, whether
willfully or by negligence, either consciously or unconsciously. Algorithms are never
totally neutral, as they have been imbued with values, given that ontologies are not born
out of nothing, but are formed by active, open and everyday practices of the world
ontologies that they are destined to describe and classify. Algorithms may themselves
be classified into policy-neutral and policy-directed, this (to make the matter even more
complicated) being not a clear dichotomy, but a spectrum. Even policy-directed
algorithms can work towards suppressing discrimination, which is a goal not usually
connected to them, but to the policy-neutral ones. What is, therefore, paramount in this
context, is both transparency of purposes, as well as the relevant accountability.

3. Conclusion
As may be clarified, human intervention does not always lessen the danger of
discrimination and that technology can prevent bias, proposing not only privacy, but also
fairness by design. This can be achieved through the application of the principle of
justice when it comes to algorithms, which will prevent discrimination. We not only need
human intervention, but also algorithmic neutrality, or 'correct' policy-directed
algorithms, as with human intervention, unfair factors may inappropriately affect
decisions. For example, an objective evaluation of candidates for a job tends to avoid
any human intervention. This may show a 'lack of trust' in human intervention, as this
was the cause of favoritism, especially in relation to positions in the public sector, which
caused a lot of distortion and damage in the past.
A purely objective evaluation may not take into account human factors such as
personality traits, which cannot normally be evaluated by technical means. Interviews
are usually necessary, so human intervention remains important, as an actual person is
certainly far more important than a mere collection of data related to him. Human
intervention must not confirm the lack of trust, but lead to a deeper evaluation of all
possible traits of human personality.
Most importantly, in order to better protect human rights, the application of the
principles of transparency and accountability is paramount. In this case, transparency
does not mean the satisfaction of the right to an explanation, or to information,
depending on the proper construction of Art. 22, as set out above, by simply delivering
the source code of the software used, as the data subject will very rarely be in a position
to decode it: instead, it relates to the disclosure of the principles, policies and purposes
that these algorithms serve, thus giving effect to the substance of the right to human
intervention under Art. 22.
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